---
name: Code Review Security
slug: code-review-security
category: Quality
description: Code Review Security checks pull requests for OWASP Top 10 issues, auth flaws, injection risks, secrets, and dependency vulnerabilities. Use it when auditing Python/FastAPI or React changes that handle user input, permissions, or sensitive data.
github: "https://github.com/nicepkg/auto-company/tree/main/.claude/skills/code-review-security"
language: Python
stars: 188
forks: 57
install: "npx degit https://github.com/nicepkg/auto-company/tree/main/.claude/skills/code-review-security ~/.claude/skills/code-review-security"
installs_to: ~/.claude/skills/code-review-security
source_path: .claude/skills/code-review-security/SKILL.md
collection_size: 25
category_size: 1745
collection_url: "https://dirskills.com/collections/nicepkg/auto-company"
added: 2026-09-06T05:20:02.248Z
last_synced: 2026-09-06T05:20:02.248Z
canonical_url: "https://dirskills.com/skills/code-review-security"
---

# Code Review Security

Code Review Security checks pull requests for OWASP Top 10 issues, auth flaws, injection risks, secrets, and dependency vulnerabilities. Use it when auditing Python/FastAPI or React changes that handle user input, permissions, or sensitive data.

**Install:**

```bash
npx degit https://github.com/nicepkg/auto-company/tree/main/.claude/skills/code-review-security ~/.claude/skills/code-review-security
```

## README

# Code Review Security

## When to Use

Activate this skill when:
- Reviewing pull requests for security vulnerabilities
- Auditing authentication or authorization code changes
- Reviewing code that handles user input, file uploads, or external data
- Checking for OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities in new features
- Validating that secrets are not committed to the repository
- Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities
- Reviewing API endpoints that expose sensitive data

**Output:** Write findings to `security-review.md` with severity, file:line, description, and recommendations.

Do NOT use this skill for:
- Deployment infrastructure security (use `docker-best-practices`)
- Incident response procedures (use `incident-response`)
- General code quality review without security focus (use `pre-merge-checklist`)
- Writing implementation code (use `python-backend-expert` or `react-frontend-expert`)

## Instructions

### OWASP Top 10 Checklist

Review every PR against the OWASP Top 10 (2021 edition). Each category below includes specific checks for Python/FastAPI and React codebases.

---

#### A01: Broken Access Control

**What to look for:**
- Missing authorization checks on endpoints
- Direct object reference without ownership verification
- Endpoints that expose data without role-based filtering
- Missing `Depends()` for auth on new routes

**Python/FastAPI checks:**
```python
# BAD: No authorization check -- any authenticated user can access any user
@router.get("/users/{user_id}")
async def get_user(user_id: int, db: Session = Depends(get_db)):
    return await user_repo.get(user_id)

# GOOD: Verify the requesting user owns the resource or is admin
@router.get("/users/{user_id}")
async def get_user(
    user_id: int,
    current_user: User = Depends(get_current_user),
    db: Session = Depends(get_db),
):
    if current_user.id != user_id and current_user.role != "admin":
        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Forbidden")
    return await user_repo.get(user_id)
```

**Review checklist:**
- [ ] Every route has authentication (`Depends(get_current_user)`)
- [ ] Resource access is verified against the requesting user
- [ ] Admin-only endpoints check `role == "admin"`
- [ ] List endpoints filter by user ownership (unless admin)
- [ ] No IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) vulnerabilities

---

#### A02: Cryptographic Failures

**What to look for:**
- Passwords stored in plaintext or with weak hashing
- Sensitive data in logs or error messages
- Hardcoded secrets, API keys, or tokens
- Weak JWT configuration

**Python checks:**
```python
# BAD: Weak password hashing
import hashlib
password_hash = hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()

# GOOD: Use bcrypt via passlib
from passlib.context import CryptContext
pwd_context = CryptContext(schemes=["bcrypt"], deprecated="auto")
password_hash = pwd_context.hash(password)

# BAD: Secret in code
SECRET_KEY = "my-super-secret-key-123"

# GOOD: Secret from environment
SECRET_KEY = os.environ["SECRET_KEY"]
```

**Review checklist:**
- [ ] Passwords hashed with bcrypt (never MD5, SHA1, or plaintext)
- [ ] JWT secret loaded from environment, not hardcoded
- [ ] Sensitive data excluded from logs (passwords, tokens, PII)
- [ ] HTTPS enforced for all external communication
- [ ] No secrets in source code (check `.env.example` has placeholders only)

---

#### A03: Injection

**What to look for:**
- Raw SQL queries with string interpolation
- `eval()`, `exec()`, `compile()` with user input
- `subprocess` calls with `shell=True`
- Template injection

**Python checks:**
```python
# BAD: SQL injection via string formatting
query = f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '{email}'"
db.execute(text(query))

# GOOD: Parameterized query
db.execute(text("SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = :email"), {"email": email})

# GOOD: SQLAlchemy ORM (always parameterized)
user = db.query(User).filter(User.email == email).first()

# BAD: Command injection
subprocess.run(f"convert {filename}", shell=True)

# GOOD: Pass arguments as a list
subprocess.run(["convert", filename], shell=False)

# BAD: Code execution with user input
result = eval(user_input)

# GOOD: Never eval user input. Use ast.literal_eval for safe parsing.
result = ast.literal_eval(user_input)  # Only for literal structures
```

**Review checklist:**
- [ ] No raw SQL with string interpolation (use ORM or parameterized queries)
- [ ] No `eval()`, `exec()`, or `compile()` with external input
- [ ] No `subprocess.run(..., shell=True)` with dynamic arguments
- [ ] No `pickle.loads()` on untrusted data
- [ ] All user input validated by Pydantic schemas before use

---

#### A04: Insecure Design

**What to look for:**
- Missing rate limiting on authentication endpoints
- No account lockout after failed login attempts
- Missing CAPTCHA on public-facing forms
- Business logic flaws (e.g., negative amounts, self-privilege-escalation)

**Review checklist:**
- [ ] Rate limiting on login, registration, and password reset
- [ ] Account lockout or exponential backoff after 5+ failed attempts
- [ ] Business logic validates constraints (positive amounts, valid transitions)
- [ ] Sensitive operations require re-authentication

---

#### A05: Security Misconfiguration

**What to look for:**
- Debug mode enabled in production
- CORS configured with wildcard `*` origins
- Default credentials or admin accounts
- Verbose error messages exposing stack traces

**Python/FastAPI checks:**
```python
# BAD: Wide-open CORS
app.add_middleware(CORSMiddleware, allow_origins=["*"])

# GOOD: Explicit allowed origins
app.add_middleware(
    CORSMiddleware,
    allow_origins=["https://app.example.com"],
    allow_methods=["GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE"],
    allow_headers=["Authorization", "Content-Type"],
)

# BAD: Debug mode in production
app = FastAPI(debug=True)

# GOOD: Debug only in development
app = FastAPI(debug=settings.DEBUG)  # DEBUG=False in production
```

**Review checklist:**
- [ ] CORS origins are explicit (no wildcard in production)
- [ ] Debug mode disabled in production configuration
- [ ] Error responses do not expose stack traces or internal details
- [ ] Default admin credentials are changed or removed
- [ ] Security headers set (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, etc.)

---

#### A06: Vulnerable and Outdated Components

**Review checklist:**
- [ ] No known CVEs in Python dependencies (`pip-audit` or `safety check`)
- [ ] No known CVEs in npm dependencies (`npm audit`)
- [ ] Dependencies pinned to specific versions in lock files
- [ ] No deprecated packages still in use

---

#### A07: Identification and Authentication Failures

**What to look for:**
- Weak password policies
- Session tokens that do not expire
- Missing multi-factor authentication for admin actions
- JWT tokens without expiration

**Python checks:**
```python
# BAD: JWT without expiration
token = jwt.encode({"sub": user_id}, SECRET_KEY, algorithm="HS256")

# GOOD: JWT with expiration
token = jwt.encode(
    {"sub": user_id, "exp": datetime.utcnow() + timedelta(minutes=30)},
    SECRET_KEY,
    algorithm="HS256",
)
```

**Review checklist:**
- [ ] JWT tokens have expiration (`exp` claim)
- [ ] Refresh tokens are stored securely and can be revoked
- [ ] Password policy enforces minimum length (12+) and complexity
- [ ] Session invalidation on password change or logout
- [ ] No user enumeration via login error messages

---

#### A08: Software and Data Integrity Failures

**Review checklist:**
- [ ] CI/CD pipeline validates artifact integrity
- [ ] No unsigned or unverified packages
- [ ] Deserialization of untrusted data uses safe methods (no `pickle.loads`)
- [ ] Database migrations are reviewed before execution

---

#### A09: Security Logging and Monitoring Failures

**Review checklist:**
- [ ] Authentication events are logged (login, logout, failed attempts)
- [ ] Authorization failures are logged with context
- [ ] Sensitive data is NOT included in logs (passwords, tokens, PII)
- [ ] Log entries include timestamp, user ID, IP address, action
- [ ] Alerting configured for suspicious patterns (brute force, unusual access)

---

#### A10: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

**What to look for:**
- User-supplied URLs used in server-side requests
- Redirect endpoints that accept arbitrary URLs

**Python checks:**
```python
# BAD: Fetch arbitrary URL from user input
url = request.query_params["url"]
response = httpx.get(url)  # SSRF: can access internal services

# GOOD: Validate URL against allowlist
ALLOWED_HOSTS = {"api.example.com", "cdn.example.com"}
parsed = urlparse(url)
if parsed.hostname not in ALLOWED_HOSTS:
    raise HTTPException(400, "URL not allowed")
response = httpx.get(url)
```

**Review checklist:**
- [ ] No server-side requests to user-controlled URLs without validation
- [ ] URL allowlists used for external integrations
- [ ] Internal service URLs not exposed in error messages

---

### Python-Specific Security Checks

Beyond OWASP, review Python code for these patterns:

| Pattern | Risk | Fix |
|---------|------|-----|
| `eval(user_input)` | Remote code execution | Remove or use `ast.literal_eval` |
| `pickle.loads(data)` | Arbitrary code execution | Use JSON or `msgpack` |
| `subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True)` | Command injection | Pass args as list, `shell=False` |
| `yaml.load(data)` | Code execution | Use `yaml.safe_load(data)` |
| `os.system(cmd)` | Command injection | Use `subprocess.run([...])` |
| Raw SQL strings | SQL injection | Use ORM or parameterized queries |
| `hashlib.md5(password)` | Weak hashing | Use `bcrypt` via `passlib` |
| `jwt.decode(token, options={"verify_signature": False})` | Auth bypass | Always verify signature |
| `open(user_path)` | Path traversal | Validate path, use `pathlib.resolve()` |
| `tempfile.mktemp()` | Race condition | Use `tempfile.mkstemp()` |

### React-Specific Security Checks

| Pattern | Risk | Fix |
|---------|------|-----|
| `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` | XSS | Use text content or sanitize with DOMPurify |
| `javascript:` in href | XSS | Validate URLs, allow only `https:` |
| `window.location = userInput` | Open redirect | Validate against allowlist |
| Storing tokens in localStorage | Token theft via XSS | Use httpOnly cookies |
| Inline event handlers from data | XSS | Use React event handlers |
| `eval()` or `Function()` | Code execution | Remove entirely |
| Rendering user HTML | XSS | Use a sanitization library |

**React code review:**
```tsx
// BAD: XSS via dangerouslySetInnerHTML
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: userBio }} />

// GOOD: Sanitize first, or use text content
import DOMPurify from "dompurify";
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: DOMPurify.sanitize(userBio) }} />

// BETTER: Use text content when HTML is not needed
<p>{userBio}</p>

// BAD: javascript: URL
<a href={userLink}>Click</a>  // userLink could be "javascript:alert(1)"

// GOOD: Validate protocol
const safeHref = /^https?:\/\//.test(userLink) ? userLink : "#";
<a href={safeHref}>Click</a>
```

### Severity Classification

Classify each finding by severity for prioritization:

| Severity | Description | Examples | SLA |
|----------|-------------|----------|-----|
| **Critical** | Exploitable remotely, no auth needed, data breach | SQL injection, RCE, auth bypass | Block merge, fix immediately |
| **High** | Exploitable with auth, privilege escalation | IDOR, broken access control, XSS (stored) | Block merge, fix before release |
| **Medium** | Requires specific conditions to exploit | CSRF, XSS (reflected), open redirect | Fix within sprint |
| **Low** | Defense-in-depth, informational | Missing headers, verbose errors | Fix when convenient |
| **Info** | Best practice recommendations | Dependency updates, code style | Track in backlog |

### Finding Report Format

When reporting security findings, use this format for consistency:

```markdown
## Security Finding: [Title]

**Severity:** Critical | High | Medium | Low | Info
**Category:** OWASP A01-A10 or custom category
**File:** path/to/file.py:42
**CWE:** CWE-89 (if applicable)

### Description
Brief description of the vulnerability and its impact.

### Vulnerable Code
```python
# The problematic code
vulnerable_function(user_input)
```

### Recommended Fix
```python
# The secure alternative
safe_function(sanitize(user_input))
```

### Impact
What an attacker could achieve by exploiting this vulnerability.

### References
- Link to relevant OWASP page
- Link to relevant CWE entry
```

### Automated Scanning

Use `scripts/security-scan.py` to perform AST-based scanning for common vulnerability patterns in Python code. The script scans for:
- `eval()` / `exec()` / `compile()` calls
- `subprocess` with `shell=True`
- `pickle.loads()` on potentially untrusted data
- Raw SQL string construction
- `yaml.load()` without `Loader=SafeLoader`
- Hardcoded secret patterns (API keys, passwords)
- Weak hash functions (MD5, SHA1 for passwords)

Run: `python scripts/security-scan.py --path ./app --output-dir ./security-results`

**Dependency scanning (run separately):**
```bash
# Python dependencies
pip-audit --requirement requirements.txt --output json > dep-audit.json

# npm dependencies
npm audit --json > npm-audit.json
```

## Examples

### Example Review Comment (Critical)

> **SECURITY: SQL Injection (Critical, OWASP A03)**
>
> File: `app/repositories/user_repository.py:47`
>
> ```python
> query = f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name LIKE '%{search_term}%'"
> ```
>
> This constructs a raw SQL query with string interpolation, allowing SQL injection.
> An attacker could input `'; DROP TABLE users; --` to destroy data.
>
> **Fix:** Use SQLAlchemy ORM filtering:
> ```python
> users = db.query(User).filter(User.name.ilike(f"%{search_term}%")).all()
> ```

### Example Review Comment (Medium)

> **SECURITY: Missing Rate Limiting (Medium, OWASP A04)**
>
> File: `app/routes/auth.py:12`
>
> The `/auth/login` endpoint has no rate limiting. An attacker could perform brute-force
> password attacks at unlimited speed.
>
> **Fix:** Add rate limiting middleware:
> ```python
> from slowapi import Limiter
> limiter = Limiter(key_func=get_remote_address)
>
> @router.post("/login")
> @limiter.limit("5/minute")
> async def login(request: Request, ...):
> ```

### Output File

Write security findings to `security-review.md`:

```markdown
# Security Review: [Feature/PR Name]

## Summary
- Critical: 0 | High: 1 | Medium: 2 | Low: 1

## Findings

### [CRITICAL] SQL Injection in user search
- **File:** app/routes/users.py:45
- **OWASP:** A03 Injection
- **Description:** Raw SQL with string interpolation
- **Recommendation:** Use SQLAlchemy ORM filtering

### [HIGH] Missing authorization check
...

## Passed Checks
- No hardcoded secrets found
- Dependencies up to date
```